

Central Asia region: A hub of Chinese interest

Shahnawaz Muhammad Khan *, Faisal Javaid

Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts Science and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan

Abstract: The collapse of USSR unveiled incredible openings for the regional and global powers to influence and exercise their economic and political processes in Central Asia. For instance, China being attached to Central Asia, has enormous prospects to effect developments in Central Asian region in the fields of natural resources and other raw materials found in this landlocked region. The purpose of this study is to find out, what are Chinese interests in Central Asia? – Specifically focusing the political and economic spheres. Why there is a dire need of those Central Asian resources towards China? How has China been progressing these benefits within the framework of multilateral and bilateral interactions? What implications the increasing interactions between China and the Central Asian Republics have for the project of One Belt One Road (OBOR)? The article addresses these questions analytically. Paper will also put some light on the impacts of this project on the economy of underdeveloped and developing countries belonging to Central and South Asian Region.

Key words: *China; Central Asia; Political interest; Economic interest*

1. Introduction

Central Asia – a four million square kilometers resource rich region, having most of the vital natural bounties and situated in the heart of Eurasia. Central Asian countries and China are geographically neighbors. The Central Asian region offers China prospect of a transportation passageway for overland communication between Europe and China, while China provides the region safe, secure passage to the Pacific Ocean (Zhuangzhi; 2007).

Knowing the significance of the region Halford Mackinder, an English geo-politician, once said whoever regulated Central Asia would exercise massive power in world sphere. (Ahrari; 2003) Hence, for countries having an existence in Central Asia, having access to the huge Caspian Sea oil reserves.

In the course of recent years, China has been financially and socially autonomous, and has assumed a key part in East Asia and Southeast Asia. China has dependably been a compelling force in the area. (Zhuangzhi; 2007) Interestingly, Central Asian nations have a background marked by fizzled endeavors to acquire political autonomy, while withstanding attack from strong neighbors.

China and Central Asia appreciated regular thriving through the "Silk Road," yet this connection was totally disconnected. Nonetheless, in the mid-1990s, as the consequence of the decline of the Soviet Union, five new nations developed in the principal district of the Asian landmass: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Ibid). With this improvement, another

chronicled period in the connection amongst China and Central Asia started.

The universal approaches of Central Asian republics and China have distinctive establishments. They are both on the Asian landmass and have generally been called Eastern nations. China is an old state and has significantly added to the improvement of world progress. Though Central Asia has a comparable social custom, it has been likewise impacted by Europe (Ibid). Since China does not have a solid religious convention, while Central Asia was a piece of the Islamic world.

Following the disintegration of USSR, China tried to assemble and fortify its ties with Central Asian countries, while initially the principle focal point of its governmental and discretionary exercises was to resolve the Soviet inheritance of debated outskirts, its relations with Central Asian region later began to reveal a developing need to secure more extensive monetary interests in the district (Mariani; 2013).

The five republics of Central Asia are invested with an enormous degree of normal assets and are situated in the central point of Eurasia (Masoud; 2014). The crumple of the Soviet Union made it feasible for these Central Asian states to create autonomous relations with whatever is left of the world. Notwithstanding, the developing monetary and geopolitical importance of these five republics to China is as of now characterizing the worldwide relations of these republics.

On the other hand, Chinese Central Asian borderlines, all the more geologically remote from heartland—and isolated by utter separation as well as by immense deserts and tough mountain ranges - appeared to be considerably less undermining than the northern attitudes (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley;

* Corresponding Author.

2014). Chinese West, similar to its American partner, has been broadly observed as a rough and stimulating frontier. In any case, likewise, internal Asia was additionally area of a key exchange course - the Silk Road - to Europe and the Middle East.

The topographical significance of the locale offers a substitute that lessens China's overwhelming dependence on the vitality imports that go by oceanic courses commanded by the US Navy (Yu; 2014). Lately, the gas and oil supply from Central Asia has ascended from covering under 5 percent to more than 10 percent of its needs.

Recently the relations amongst Central Asia and China have been growing. The area has ascended from a minimal position to getting to be one of the best needs in China's foreign approach system, (Ibid) and is a district of incredible geostrategic significance showing the two chances and difficulties to China's security, financial and political interests.

1.1. Objectives of research

The objectives of this research are; to identify the different interests of China in Central Asia, to determine the issues faced by Chinese government regarding shortage of natural resources, to describe the relations of China with different Central Asian countries in quest of fulfillment of its interest and to analyze the role of Central Asian countries and China in One Belt One Road project.

1.2. Research questions

The purpose of this study is to find out, what are Chinese economic and political interests in Central Asian region? Why there is a dire need of those Central Asian resources towards China? How has China been proceeding these interests within the context of bilateral and multilateral interactions? What implications the increasing interactions between the Central Asian countries and China have for the project of One Belt One Road (OBOR)?

1.3. Limitations

The paper is restricted to only economic and political interest of China in Central Asian region and the study is also limited to the statistics of last two decades.

2. Literature review

2.1. Chinese interests in central Asia

China had a strong interest in stable, peaceful and prosperous Central Asian region. This contributed to ensuring energy supplies and securing the stability in the independent region of Xinjiang, in the country's northwest (Ibid).

Chinese concerns in Central Asian region primarily lied in four sections: (1) to keep up steady and nonviolent boundaries with Central Asian

countries and Russia that was essential for financial improvement of further western regions and Xinjiang; (2) to cut any global connection with its local revolutionist powers in Xinjiang that was serious state safety issue for Beijing; (3) to expand and protect Chinese entrance to the foundations of vitality for its financial development; and (4) to spread Chinese impact to this particular area that would be advantageous for geopolitical position of China in the intentional conditions of after Cold War (Hu; 2004).

Expanding Chinese impression had accelerated the rivalry amongst significant forces to protect their benefits in Central Asian region, including the US, European Union, Russia, Turkey and India (Yu; 2014). European Union had for quite some time been Central Asia's greatest business collaborator for a considerable length of time, yet it was rushed past by China in 2010.

Among the basic sources of energy for Chinese economy Xinjiang was on top position, where oil is the most prominent asset. Turpan, Junggar and Tarim are the three oil basins within the Xinjiang and among them Tarim basin was apparently the biggest uncultivated sources of oil on the planet (Hu; 2004), with a few evaluations of potential stores going as high as 147 billion barrels. Oil assets of Xinjiang were essential to the forthcoming energy security of China, especially as its expansive oil reserves from east like Shengli, Daqing and Liaohe were quite developed and start to decrease underway.

The only border that China shared with Central Asia was through the Xinjiang; which was with Kazakhstan around 1,700 kilo meters, with Kyrgyzstan roughly 1,000 km and with Tajikistan around 450 km (Tukmadiyeva; 2013). In addition, Xinjiang was firmly connected to Central Asian region by ethnic, religious social and ties.

Peace and prosperity in Xinjiang was of prime importance for Chinese government due to the district's significance to China's extended national security, financial advancement and its sovereignty (Hu; 2004). In Xinjiang there were feared that a releasing of China's influence may empower other populaces in different areas, for example, Inner Mongolia or Tibet, or to expand their own particular dissident exercises, or declining the reliability of Chinese sense of duty regarding reunification with Taiwan.

More prominent financial advancement, powered by expanded exchange with Central Asian region, was a major part of China's way to deal with battling dissidence and keeping up enduring peace and prosperity in Xinjiang. Chinese pioneers were confident that expanded financial association with Central Asian countries will reinforce common administrations of district against spiritual or ethnic-based gatherings who may effectively bolster nonconformist gatherings in Xinjiang (Ibid). Expanded exchange will upgrade security inside the possibly unstable Central Asian nations. This objective was more significant to Chinese strategy

toward Central Asia than its arrangement toward Russia.

Moreover, energy based financial collaboration was another central Chinese concern for the district. China developed its vitality collaboration with Central Asia amid a visits of President Xi. In Turkmenistan, the biggest gas provider of China, Xi declared the starting of second-greatest gas field in production of the globe; a contract of 30 billion US dollars (Yu; 2014) incorporating a position in Kashagan oilfield was marked in Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan, another 15 billion US dollars agreement of gas, oil and uranium was signed.

Turmoil in Central Asia held a considerably more noteworthy prospective for influencing Chinese own particular interior strength than did agitation in Russia. China was developing railroad systems with Central Asian republics. The volume of trans-Eurasian rail exchange will rise with more created railroad systems crosswise over outskirts (Hu; 2004). As far as it matters for them, the Central Asian governments shared a considerable lot of Chinese worries about the threats that worldwide ethnic or religious gatherings posture to territorial dependability. Their mainstream approaches and affectability to China's worries over dissident gatherings working out of their nations had made it less demanding for China to seek after more open financial strategies. The joint affirmations of Sino-Central Asia consistently push the requirement to restrict all types of ethnic dissent, and preclude others from taking part in dissenter exercises in individual nations against the opposite side.

2.2. Chinese political interests in central Asia

Nowadays, Central Asia and China were developing a better governmental relationship since they shared a 3,300-kilometer border with having deepened social ties (Zhuangzhi; 2007). Chinese basic strategies toward Central Asia included: 1. Nonviolent and good friendly relations; 2. Participation based on shared advantage; 3. Taking care of the decisions of Central Asian individuals and non-obstruction in the local issues of different countries; and 4. Concerning the autonomous power of Central Asian States with advancing the regional strength.

Notwithstanding a considerably more profound financial engagement, the Central Asia region had additionally faced an expansion in political, strategic, and social ties with China. Every one of the five nations had consented to key engagements with China. The state visits by Chinese authorities had escalated. Confucius Institutes, which offered social projects and dialect courses, were currently existing in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Mariani; 2013). Similarly Network University of SCO was also inaugurated in the year 2010 as another stage of collaboration in the fields of learning institutions and the exchange of locals from one place to another.

The unstable circumstance in the Xinjiang territory of China was a critical determinant in Chinese Central Asia strategy. The Uyghurs had been battling for more prominent self-rule and autonomy for quite a long time. Uyghurs present in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had solid relations with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang territory of China. Since disintegration of USSR and consequent development of independent countries in Central Asia, Uyghurs residing in and outside Xinjiang had imagined the likelihood of a free East Turkistan. The battle for autonomy had been successful ahead since 1949 after Muslim territory of East Turkistan was combined into China.

Today, restless Uyghurs were probably going to look Central Asian Republics (CARs) for help in their motivation. As per authorized figures, Central Asia was home of around 300,000 Uyghurs, of whom 30,000 lived in Uzbekistan, 210,000 lived in Kazakhstan and around 46,000 in Kyrgyzstan (Dwivedi; 2006). The government of China was concerned about widespread help to East Turkistan in Xinjiang and among the Uyghurs present in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The danger of Uyghurs on along the common border regions joining together and endeavoring to satisfy their yearnings had fuelled fears of a probable separation of Xinjiang district.

The developing significance of Central Asia in Chinese political affairs was richly clear for various reasons. One was the numerous security dangers that Chinese eyewitnesses fear. Most critical, in any case, was the way that Central Asia's nearness to China drove Beijing to see Central Asian approach and security as a projection of its inward security plan (Blank; 2008). This made steadiness in Central Asia as indispensable for China as it was for Russia. Chinese experts had a tendency to trust these dangers can be overwhelmed by well-thought activities and approaches on China's part. In this setting such well-thought activities mean giving chances to China's domestic monetary development and the narrowing of western military and political impact. Chinese think tanks accepted such tightening was fundamental if China was to effectively neutralize by the Muslim minority among Xinjiang's Uyghur populace. Chinese leaders trust these developments can't prevail without outside help. China's Central Asian approach moved from the basic to keep up solidness in Xinjiang, thwarting any uprising or insurrection, while safeguarding the steadiness of the present administration from remote impacts.

Recently, leaders of Chinese government had been greatly dynamic around the globe, going for meetings and official visits, however their most continuous destinations were in Central Asian region (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014). In the same way, in September 2013, Chinese President Xi, started an expanded journey in Central Asian region. In doing as such, he was the third successive Chinese head to give that much intensive consideration to the locale.

President Xi likewise went to Kazakhstan, there he presented a noteworthy speech concentrating on Chinese approach to Central Asian region at Nazarbayev University (Ibid). Xi indorsed possibility of the Silk Road Economic Belt and reported various other Chinese activities.

Thinking about the provincial steadiness, constructive activities in China's northwest brought some financial advantages to the Muslims in Xinjiang and might mitigate a portion of the nonconformist inclinations, despite disregard towards such tasks by Muslim populace to enhance their way of life (Hu and Cheng; 2008). China saw improvement of its western area, incorporating expanding oil creation in Xinjiang, as imperative to its monetary security.

2.3. Economic interests

Chinese monetary impression in Central Asia had developed altogether in 21st century, both as far as exchange and ventures. China was especially overwhelming as a business partner together with the Central Asian States, and now it outperformed Russia as Central Asia's best merchant. As far as foreign direct investment in Central Asia Chinese offer had been developing and it had never surpassed 10% of the area's aggregate. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Central Asian region had a tendency to be overwhelmed by US and Europe, and the bigger part of this venture was centered on Kazakhstan, where 80 to 90% of all FDI streaming into whole locale in every year from 1999 to 2008 had purportedly gone to Kazakhstan. As indicated by International Monetary Fund, in 2009, Netherlands and the U.S. together represented a little more than half of total foreign investment in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, Russia and China were more important external business partners in Kyrgyzstan, despite the fact that the measure of aggregate FDI in Kyrgyzstan was a small amount of Kazakhstan's FDI (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014).

Chinese trade and business with Central Asian countries had kept on developing quickly, achieving an indorsed trade balance of over 25 billion dollars by 2008, in this manner moving toward Russia's own exchange with Central Asian countries in estimate (Ibid). China had progressively brought Central Asian countries inside its financial circle. Its exchange with Central Asian nations expanded 30-times from 2000 to 2010, from some \$1 billion in 2000 to nearly \$30 billion in 2010. Valuable metals, energy and other regular assets stream into China from Central Asian republics, the report noted that investment flows the other route, as China constructed pipelines, electrical cables and transport systems connecting Central Asian region to its north-western area, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Weitz; 2006).

Managing financial development and success inside China implies advancing exchange and speculation with adjoining nations and safeguarding new energy sources. Collaboration in the fields of energy and financial interests were likewise

essential drivers. China had moved to achieve financial accompaniment amongst Xinjiang and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. With those nations, China had sought after a state-driven expansion model of monetary relations, attempting to advance exchange, business and transport links. The monetary objectives for China were connected both to safeguarding governmental binds and to encouraging financial improvement of Xinjiang. Thus, Beijing had concentrated on the improvement of rail, air courses and roadways that open areas to exchange. China's business volume with Central Asian republics has developed quickly and, despite the fact that a little segment of aggregate Chinese business, made China a high-positioning trade accomplice of a large portion of Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014).

Growing monetary participation had given China a chance to use its greatest benefit in Central Asian region, its economy. Regardless of moderate extension of financial relations, China had turned into a huge commercial partner together with a portion of Central Asian republics, prominently Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (Ibid). Besides, China appeared to be keen in making SCO in excess of a security association by extending the monetary measurement. While the financial participation was unequivocally specified in association's establishing assertion, practically the majority of China's endeavors are respective and just approximately connected to SCO.

Expanding trade and business along its Central Asian and Russian border areas served various benefits for China. Initially, it expanded Sino-Central Asian and Sino-Russian relationships outside issues of safety. The growing business ties with them were likewise seen as intends to improve financial advancement in Chinese inside districts (Hu; 2004). This wasn't just predictable with over-all financial policy of opening up, yet in addition approach to address developing issues of uneven improvement among China's various regions.

This development in trade and business was intensely subject to relations with Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan was likewise vital as a result of a gas pipeline connecting both nations that formally functioning in December 2009 and was set to achieve maximum limit of 40 billion cubic meters yearly by 2013 (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014). Economic relations between China and Uzbekistan had developed as of late too, and Tajikistan had some trade and business with China and in addition getting some financial help. At long last, while Kyrgyzstan wasn't pivotal to China's trade balance, China was also very necessary for Kyrgyzstan in making up very nearly 90% of outside exchange of Kyrgyzstan – that comprised chiefly of imports from China.

Today, an extensive system of air flights, railroads, roads, correspondence and gas and oil pipelines attached Chinese with the Central Asian region. In 2012, completing nearly \$46 billion of

business with all the district's republics, China was the most noticeable trade player and primary basis of foreign investment in the area. As China had discretionary ties with five Central Asian republics in 1992, its general exchange with area had expanded 100-times (Mariani; 2013). Immense funding and foreign direct interest in the field of natural asset extraction, energy, and merchandises, for example, the Central Asian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, Atyrau-Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, the development of new streets and passages in Tajikistan, huge interests in vitality transportation and correspondence in Uzbekistan and extension of street associations amongst Kyrgyzstan and China had created numerous features.

2.4. China's energy needs

Chinese interest for vitality to fuel its financial development seemed limitless, and vitality imports kept on rising. Since 1993 China had been clear importer of oil. It was likewise net merchant of coal and petroleum gas: In 2011 China imported 192,499 thousand short tons of coal while sending out 18,165 thousand. That year, it imported 1,108 billion cubic feet of petroleum gas while sending out 113 billion. In 2011 China consumed 3,826,869 thousand short tons (76.118 quadrillion btu) of coal, which made up 69.4% of its aggregate vitality utilization that year and 4,624 billion cubic feet (4.850 quadrillion btu) of gaseous petrol, which constituted 4.4% of aggregate utilization.

The current Chinese president and his Turkmen corresponding person consented to arrangements to extend vitality participation between them in September 2013, including an agreement to build another pipeline of gas, named Route D (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014), planned to be finished till 2016. Whenever completed, it will extend somewhere in the range of 850 kilometers through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. There the Chinese President formally opened another gas field at Galkynysh with development of new multi-billion dollar pipeline of liquefied natural gas. The Route D pipeline will turn into the second course and endorse Chinese standing as main client for Turkmen gas.

China was the third-biggest energy utilizer after US and Japan. It was additionally a nation whose economy was quickly developing which had unevenly developing districts. Its southeastern seaside territory was encountering especially quick financial advancement, contrasted and different zones. This situation alone emphasized the way that its energy requirements in future will rise. Chinese energy utilization had revealed a remarkable increase from a sum of 4.36 million barrels daily (bbl/d) in 1999 to 4.78 million bbl/d in 2000. Utilization in 2001 was informed to be 4.9 million bbl/d, while oil creation from local reservoirs was at 3.3 million (Ahrari; 2003) for that year. As a growing economy, Chinese energy utilization was predicted

to surpass the amount of Japan in coming decade, achieving 10.5 million bbl/d by 2020.

China imported around 20 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas, near twofold what Russia imported in 2013. When all the contemporary arranged pipelines were set up, China expects to import 65 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas by 2016 (Merkel, Council and Center; 2014).

Chinese geo-economic benefits in Central Asia identified with the capacity of states to procure crude resources and corner territorial markets. In connection to crude material stores, Central Asia was significant to China since it was second after Arabian Gulf as far as oil assets. The Central Asian area had huge oil and gas assets – Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and to a lesser degree Uzbekistan (Hu and Cheng; 2008) - and China had started to connect up the pipelines from these states to China's western border area.

Elsewhere these exceptionally obvious indications of Chinese developing hard power, less observable delicate power perspectives had likewise extended in region. The Chinese ideal of monetary improvement and its training framework had expanding claim. For instance, more Central Asian students study in China than in Russia since 2010 (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014).

Energy resources of Central Asia were among the main interest of China in Central Asia, in 2012, China had trade in 21.3 billion cubic meters of gaseous petrol from Turkmenistan - the greater part of its entire flammable gas imports that year - and by 2020 the amount could bounce to very nearly 65 billion cubic meters. Similarly, Chinese imports of oil from Kazakhstan were set to develop significantly in near future, as yield from the Kashagan oil projects increased possibly achieving 1.5 million barrels for each day (Stratfor Worldview; 2013). China was additionally functioning on metals and oil ventures in Afghanistan, had consented to import up to 10 billion cubic meter of gaseous petrol from Uzbekistan and was at same time quickly changing Xinjiang itself into a major asset base for recently industrializing Chinese territories.

Chinese government officials were progressively worried about energy security. In spite of the fact that the heft of Chinese energy requirement were met by coal, oil was a consistently growing division of vitality utilization. Progressively China also looked outside countries to meet its vitality necessities, even for coal. There were two fundamental methods of conveyance accessible to recover those assets to China: delivery courses and pipelines. For last two decades China had been reliant on ocean paths and activities to develop channels to Central Asian region and Russia had been very complex and slow to get benefit from it. Though, Beijing was quick to expand its supply courses and energy sources. China felt exceptionally defenseless where its ocean lines of correspondence were concerned. Therefore, there was incredible enthusiasm for building pipelines to Russia, to Central Asia, and to other ports like one in Pakistan.

China likewise had significant energy assets inside its peripheries, however improvement had demonstrated tedious and costly. China's biggest oil and petroleum gas reservoirs were situated in Xinjiang, mainly in Tarim Basin, where they were far from applications of demand in eastern China. In addition, China's investigators trust local vitality assets will be deficient and nation will confront deficiencies without outside sources can be secured (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley; 2014).

2.5. Structure of Sino-central Asian trade

Now China and Kyrgyzstan were connected from the WTO thus just they advantage from trade policies encouraging issues like tariff commitments and other custom duties.

With a specific end goal to encourage exchange, Beijing had overwhelmingly upheld the requests of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to join the WTO. Kyrgyzstan had done similarly; its desire was that every one individual from Eurasian Economic Community were included to WTO so expanding exchange with China will be liable to steady directions. It was in light of a legitimate concern for the Central Asian republics, as much as it was in Chinese, to build up their common relationships on the grounds that their economies were more reciprocal to, as opposed to in coordinate rivalry with, each other. China, for instance, had the ability to send out purchaser items to Central Asian countries at low costs, i.e., at costs suitable to the low expectation for everyday comforts of the Central Asian masses, while Russian, Turkish, and Iranian, also Western, items were excessively costly. The outcome was that in excess of 85% of Chinese shipments to Central Asian region comprised of completed products. The invert was valid for the Central Asian countries: more than 85% of their exports comprised of petroleum, crude materials, ferrous and nonferrous metals.

It is very hard to survey the figures of trade amongst Central Asia and China, since these official figures that assess the substances of border trade and business were even less of the smuggled goods network. Also, the data gave by China, from one viewpoint, and Central Asian countries, on the other, are not frequently in understanding. It appeared to be best, be that as it may, to run with the Chinese measurements, since Chinese exporters had next to no motivating force to underestimate their deals to Central Asia in light of the fact that the custom obligations are for all intents and purposes non-existent. Along these lines, Chinese measurements incorporate insignificant exchange, which the Central Asian specialists don't check. In this manner, for 2006, China declared exchange figures of 13 billion dollars that was, 23% more than the official figures given by the Central Asian countries (Peyrouse; 2007). For the two nations with which Chinese outskirt exchange is the best, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the figures were particularly dissimilar. In this manner, in 2005, Kazakhstan was,

as per Astana, expected to have imported products worth 1.2 billion dollars from China, yet Beijing put the figure at near 4 billion; Astana assessed exports to be worth 2,423 million dollars, while Chinese figures incorporated an extra 500 million. With Kyrgyzstan, the deviations were considerably more prominent: for 2005, Chinese figures were ten times higher than Kyrgyz figures, 30 million in exports and 100 million in imports as indicated by Bishkek; 300 million and 1 billion separately as per Beijing.

As indicated by Stephen Blank's, the trade amongst China and Central Asia was set up 'a commonly gainful relationship' [in which the monetary use turns into a political instrument], in spite of the fact that 'prompting long time reliance', i.e. Middle Kingdom won a relatively anticompetitive position confronting provincial states, coming about because of their reliance in what concerned the Chinese market, as far as imports, exports and financing. For instance, Blank noted that 'the Tajik Government acknowledged an advance of a few million dollars premium free, from China in 2007', trailed by a 'political participation contention, under which Tajikistan swore not to perceive Taiwan as an autonomous country'.

Amongst the Central Asian countries with more significance to the Chinese benefits in neighborhood, one can feature Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which were both invested with considerable vitality assets. As per Richard Weitz, 'Kazakhstan was at present most vital Chinese monetary and important collaborator in Central Asia'. From one viewpoint, it was the biggest State in the region; then again, it had impressive stores of oil, petroleum gas and other vital crude materials including uranium. Fundamental Chinese interests in Kazakhstan dwell in those stores of oil, uranium and gaseous petrol; in coordinating transportation and travel foundations (local and national) with Xinjiang; and in combining governmental impact in Astana.

In 2009 China allowed credits to Kazakhstan worth 10 billion dollars in place to acquire Central Asian gas and oil. As Wenran Jiang mentions, 'China's investment approach in Kazakhstan' was construct for the most part in light of the model 'advances in return for oil supplies', which gave Chinese organizations 'coordinate control over assets'.

2.6. Energy and economic relations between China and central Asia

For a long time, China was energy independent; in any case, as its economy had developed, so had its interest for vitality. In 1993, its oil request exceeded local supply and then it turned into a net oil merchant; in 2006, it turned into a net gas importer. But in 20 years it turned into the world's biggest energy user and in 2012 it imported 57% of its oil. In the event that present patterns proceed, it would depend on imports for 66% of its oil supply by 2020 (Stegen and Kuszniir; 2015). Chinese authorities had turned out to be progressively stressed over energy security and had attempted various methodologies.

Locally, the government supported more prominent gas and oil investigation and generation, energy protection and the advancement of sustainable power sources among different measures. Universally, authorities concerns on securing transportation courses and energy supply chains.

The energy assets of Central Asia were required to have an emergent influence in the Chinese economy because of geographic closeness and shared peripheries. The Caspian Sea and its nearby zones were the third biggest territory in realm of energy assets that were developable. Kazakhstan, specifically, had oil stores from 9 to 40 billion barrels and in near future predicted oil generation would be of 100 million tons. In 2015 Kazakhstan's yield of natural gas was 50 billion cubic meters while its household utilization won't surpass 16 billion cubic meters. While Turkmenistan, had stores of 12-21 trillion cubic meters of petroleum gas. To extend the market for those energy assets, the Central Asian countries require capital for mechanical and foundation updates, and China, holding more than two trillion foreign trade reserves notwithstanding having the innovative skill, was conceivably a major source of foreign direct venture (FDI).

Steadily, China was moving into the Central Asian energy improvement showcase. Kazakhstan was as of now biggest exchanging accomplice of China, with official two-sided trade in 2007 totaling over \$13.9 billion in U.S. dollars (Business Reference Service; 2015). China had enabled Kazakhstan to exchange on its sea port of Lianyungang keeping up last's freedom from Russian regulated transport entries. Additionally, opening of the Almaty-Urumqi rail lines demonstrates their relationship was something other than business exchange.

2.7. The hydrocarbon question

The thrust for energy of the Chinese added to the reinforcing of ties with Central Asian administrations, which were all looking for new marketplaces for their hydrocarbons keeping in mind the end goal to release their dependence on Russia. Regardless of whether generation costs for hydrocarbons of Central Asia demonstrated greater than those in Middle East and they held two benefits: China thought of them as dependable lasting investment and demands governmental organizations together and strong coordination of interests between the included states. On the other hand, the development of oil and gas pipelines associating Central Asian fields to Chinese marketplaces was in fact and fiscally difficult issue. The separations included range from 3,000 to 10,000 km and the cost kept running up to a few billion dollars. Also, China arrived quite a while after principle worldwide organizations that set up themselves on most encouraging sites. China neglected to participate in utilization of Kashagan field, among the five biggest on the planet with an expected generation of 1.5 Mbbls/d in 2015, and of Tengiz, creation of which should achieve 700

kbbls/d in 2015. Beijing could surely keep on being a performer in Central Asian region and Caspian oil areas without these fields, however with just auxiliary significance. Chinese firms had a tendency to obtain inferior fields and look to set up themselves in nations like Uzbekistan, which were to some degree disregarded in oil and gas matters. Nonetheless, China's leap forward, achieved in only a couple of few years, was still exceptionally obvious. With different pipeline start-up schemes, it was additionally considered very noteworthy (Peyrouse; 2007).

The presence of China in the business sectors in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, could significantly change the geopolitics of whole area, re-orientating it and its hydrocarbons, toward the south and toward the east.

Other Central Asian countries were also observing expanded trade and business with China. China marked a mutual contract in 2006 with Turkmenistan, consenting to purchase 30 billion cubic meters of gaseous petrol sends out a year between 2009 and 2039. Furthermore, Uzbekistan consented to an arrangement to assemble a gas pipeline of 530 kilometers with limit of 30 billion cubic meters between both nations; and the CNPC consented to a \$600 million deal with Uzbekneftegaz, for somewhere in the range of 23 tinier oil fields in the Bukhara region. Respective exchange amongst Tajikistan and China was \$158 million in 2005. Tajikistan was likewise the biggest beneficiary of China's \$900 million of special export advances to individuals from the SCO (Business Reference Service; 2015). China's enthusiasm for hydropower production was additionally developing. The nation had set up associations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for building electrical cables, and had turned into a member of energy and water resources consortium set up by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Aside from Central Asia's vital area in the heart of Eurasia, its immense natural resources had drawn extensive consideration. The Central Asian region was luxuriously invested with energy sources—oil, gas and hydrocarbons. The likelihood of undiscovered stores being high was additionally genuine. With energy security and oil politics involving the middle phase of worldwide political issues, the battle to control Central Asia's energy assets had heightened. Since the mid-1990s, China had additionally emerged as a merchant of oil. To keep up its modernization practice and rate of development, China would need to import oil in the about 200 to 300 million tons in near future. Presently, China required roughly 60 million tons of oil for each year. In this manner, import of oil and gaseous petrol and interest in abroad energy advancement venture had gained another need in China's energy procedure.

2.8. The continued expansion of Chinese demand

As per U.S. State Department, Chinese interest for oil would dramatically increase by 2020 achieving

the peak of 11 million b/d, whereas that of natural gas would three times to 3.6 bcm yearly. In spite of the fact that the nation still expends monstrous measures of coal, oil speaks to a fourth of current energy utilization. Petroleum gas remains barely used, around three percent, however the Chinese experts want to grow its utilization to 10% of national energy utilization (Peyrouse; 2007).

Obviously, China isn't the main nation peering toward the assets of Central Asian region. Western Europe, India, Russia and the United States were also fascinated too. Subsequently it is nothing unexpected that Central Asia as of late has turned into the focal point of world consideration.

2.9. Chinese inroads in central Asia: trade and investments

For landlocked Central Asian region, the Chinese monetary motor engine up the possibility of another trans-Eurasian passages and was along these lines seen as a one of a kind recorded opportunity. Between 2002 and 2003, exchange expanded around 300% going from about 1 billion US dollar every year to in excess of 3 billion. An expansion of 150% took after between 2004 and 2006, with exchange achieving more than 10 billion US dollars as indicated by Central Asian figures, or 13 billion US dollars, as per Chinese figures. In the later 2000s, China intently trailed Russia. In 2008, preceding the world financial downturn, exchange amongst Central Asia and China surpassed 25 billion US dollars, while trade amongst Russia and Central Asia was US\$27 billion. From that point forward, China has obviously picked up the high ground while Russia has stagnated, with US\$29 billion for Beijing contrasted with under 22 billion for Moscow in 2010. Chinese President Xi in 2013, raised the activity of mutually developing Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. This activity, which incorporated nations arranged on first Silk Road through West Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and Europe, required reconciliation of region into a strong financial territory by building framework, expanding social trades, and widening exchange. Exchange had been developing since 2009, coming to 45 billion US dollars in 2014 (Peyrouse; 2016).

3. Research methodology

The method used for the research is qualitative research method, with the basic sources from books, journals and other news items. In addition to it some quantitative analysis are also present in the paper.

4. Discussion and findings

Analyzing the above discussed material it is evident that the core Chinese interest in the region is a stable, peaceful and prosperous Central Asia. It is to ensure required energy deliveries towards China and protect the strength in the independent region

of Xinjiang. Maintaining nonviolent borders with Central Asian countries is also necessary to expand and secure Chinese contact to the foundations of energy for its financial development with the extension of its influence to this region.

The discussion shows that China's basic political objectives toward Central Asia include: cordial relations with CARs in consideration with mutual benefits and common prosperity, preventing itself from interfering in internal matters of CARs and respecting the choices of their locals with the promotion of regional stability.

Marinating the stability in China's western border region Xinjiang, with the stability of bordering CARs, the Chinese motive is to countervail the Uyghurs and their mission for backing from their neighbors by utilizing the common grounds of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Since China and Central Asia have concerns on rise of terrorism, religious extremism and separatism due to the Uyghur issues.

It is also observed that to fight self-government and preserving long-term stability in Xinjiang, a massive financial expansion, powered by improved trade with Central Asian region, is among the central components of approach of Beijing. As the Xinjiang is closely connected to Central Asia by cultural, historical, religious and ethnic ties.

Economic cooperation on the basis of energy is another major Chinese concern in region and for that safeguarding the steady transport of energy resources from Central Asia is an important geostrategic consideration of China. In achieving economic goals, China is predominantly leading as a business partner with countries of Central Asia and in this regards it exceeded Russia as Central Asian top trader.

For increasing the trade activities, Beijing has focused on the development of other means of communication like highway, rail and air routes that open boundaries to trade. It is also reviewed that Chinese trade with Central Asian countries has grown rapidly that makes China a worthy trade companion of Central Asian countries.

Furthermore, utilizing the multilateral forums like SCO China is keen to increase its financial interest in Central Asian region. Whereas the monetary collaboration was clearly declared in the organization's founding pronouncement. So, for the greater economic cooperation increased trade is generally needed between the countries and in this way their relations would become more established as every country play its due part in monetary growth of the other.

With massive population growth and economic development, China is the third-largest consumer of vitality but unfortunately it also has some uneven developing regions. In this regards a clear picture can be seen for future energy requirements that its energy needs in future will surely rise. It is also assumed that Chinese energy ingesting is predicted to surpass that of Japan's in near future, reaching 10.5 million bbl/d by 2020. As statistics showed that

in a period of 20 years, China became the world's largest energy consumer as in 2012 it imported 57% of its oil. If current trends continue, by 2020 it would depend on imports for 66% of its oil supply.

Through OBOR, China is and will unquestionably stay as the biggest financial stockholder in Central Asian region. It is main nation that can activate enormous interest in area, a long ways past what Western nations and Russia can offer. However whatsoever its results, Chinese developing contribution in Central Asian region is a long haul wonder and the defining moment in Central Asia's post-Soviet history and financial improvement.

A representative for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce noted in April 2017 that since 2013, the year in which President Xi Jinping reported the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) at Nazarbayev University, 304.9 billion US dollars (Voices on Central Asia; 2018) in contracts have been marked amongst China and the economies along the course.

5. Conclusion

The security and energy issues are the driving forces behind the Chinese interests in Central Asian Republics. Since China needs energy resources in order to cater the huge population with the steady economic development, consequently the Central Asian region is the best option. There are other factors that continue in favor of the way the Central Asian Republics perceive China's interest in Central Asian region. Unlike others, the Chinese Government has the capacity to provide a wide-ranging financial support to these countries, which is vital to the development of their economies.

Marinating peaceful political relations are also very necessary in order to fulfill the Chinese interest in the region. In addition to it, the establishment of peace and prosperity in the border regions' are also very helpful in achieving the Chinese political and economic goals.

6. Recommendations

The secret of Chinese interest in the region is in the best possible cordial relations with the CARs. Therefore a win-win relationship, powered by increased trade and financial development in region is a must to do by Chinese authorities. Because the infrastructural developments in the CARs done by Chinese counterparts are also a source to achieve economic gains from the region.

The political unrest in the bordering areas between China and Central Asia can become a big hurdle in attaining the Chinese goals from the heartland. Subsequently, proper policies should be formulated in order to fight the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism.

Since the topic is much diversified and have contemporary significance, therefore constant studies should be needed in order to get up to the mark knowledge.

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